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Regulation of Land Access for Resource Development: A Coal Seam Gas Case Study from 
Queensland 
Sharon Christensen, Pamela O’Connor, W D Duncan and Angela Phillips* 
 
 
A number of regulatory statutes provide for agreements with landowners which are given extended effect, that is, 
are binding upon the landowner’s successors (‘statutory agreements’). Several Queensland statutes require a 
project proponent to enter into a statutory agreement with a landowner before a resource development activity 
can be carried out on private land or by accessing private land.  Provisions of  Queensland’s Petroleum and 
Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 make certain types of statutory agreements binding upon successors and 
assigns of the landowner, but do not clearly prescribe the nature and contents of an agreement, nor require that 
the agreement be recorded on the land title or petroleum register. If statutory agreements are to be used for 
such purposes, their purpose and content should be more clearly defined by statute and they should be recorded 
on a searchable register. 
 
Recent years have seen more comprehensive regulation of the environment, natural resources and 
cultural heritage, and a greater emphasis on achieving regulatory outcomes by negotiating agreements 
with landowners. Complementing these changes is a legislative trend to provide for new types of 
agreements which are given extended effect,
1
 meaning that they are deemed to bind not just the 
landowner who enters into the agreement, but also the landowner’s successors (statutory agreements). 
The agreements are modelled on the doctrine of the restrictive covenant, but the legislation that 
provides for the statutory agreements typically omits one or more of the rules by which equity limited 
the class of covenants that run with land.  Equity would not enforce a covenant that imposed a 
positive obligation on the landowner, nor one that was for the personal benefit of the covenantee (a 
covenant in gross) rather than for the benefit of the covenantee’s land. In contrast, statutory 
agreements are almost invariably in gross, and some of the legislation makes both positive and 
negative covenants enforceable against successors and assigns.  
 
The early forms of statutory agreements were made between a landowner and a public authority to 
achieve a regulatory purpose, such as the preservation of a sensitive environment or cultural heritage, 
or to achieve planning objectives.
2
 More recently, all States have legislated to give extended effect to 
certain agreements made between a landowner and a private party. For example, some States have 
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1 As the drafting is not consistent, we use this phrase to refer to a number of statutes which may provide that the agreement binds the 
landowner’s  ‘assigns and successors’, ‘successors in title’ or ‘successors and persons deriving title under or through the landowner or a 
successor’.  
2 Aboriginal Heritage Act 2006 (Vic) pts 4, 5 (cultural heritage management plans and cultural heritage agreements respectively); Nature 
Conservation Act 1992 (Qld), s 51, pt 7 (management and conservation plans); Queensland Heritage Act 1992 (Qld) pt 7 (heritage 
agreements); Sustainable Planning Act 2009 (Qld) ch 8 pt 2 (infrastructure agreements); Planning and Environment Act 1987 (Vic) ss 173-
184; Land Use Planning and Approvals Act 1993 (Tas) ss 70-80A; Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW) ss 93F-93L. 
2 
 
legislated for the creation of property rights in trees growing on land and carbon sequestered in biota 
such as forests, vegetation or soil.
3
 The rights are only partly defined by the legislation, which allows 
parties to add their own terms in ancillary agreements which purport to bind the landowner’s 
successors.
4
 It seems that the primary concern of the drafters is to give a high degree of freedom of 
transaction to the original parties who create the rights. Apart from requiring some form of entry on 
the land title register, little thought has been given to the uncertainties that novel and non-standard 
real property rights create for successors in title. 
 
The statutory provisions which on their face give extended effect to agreements between the 
landowner and third parties can interact in complex ways with property law rules relating to freehold 
covenants and provisions in the Torrens statutes. The legal implications of giving extended effect to 
statutory agreements between private parties are under-theorised. This can result in inadequately 
drafted provisions which are difficult to interpret or have unintended effects.  
The current regime for resources development in Queensland is one particular example of the use of 
statutory agreements. Before resources development can be carried out on private land in Queensland, 
the project proponent must enter into a statutory agreement regarding access, conduct and 
compensation (land access agreement) with the landowner. This requirement applies for mining 
projects, petroleum and gas projects, geothermal projects and greenhouse gas storage projects.
5
 In 
particular the entry into land access agreements for coal seam gas projects warrants examination due 
to their significant recent and projected growth,
6
 and the concern of landowners, local communities 
and the public about their environmental impacts.  
 
In this article we illustrate the difficulties and consequences of entry into land access agreements by a 
detailed examination of provisions in Queensland’s Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 
2004 (the Act).
7
 The Act authorises the undertaking of petroleum and gas projects upon private land, 
including coal seam gas projects.
8
 Coal seam gas exploration and extraction are conducted under an 
                                                          
3 Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) ss 87A, 88AB; Forestry Act 1959 (Qld) pts 6B, 6C; Forest Property Act 2000 (SA) pt 2, ss 3, 3A; Forestry 
Rights Registration Act 1990 (Tas) ss 3, 5; Forestry Rights Act 1996 (Vic) s 3 (since repealed and replaced by the Climate Change Act 2010 
(Vic) ss 20-26); Carbon Rights Act 2003 (WA) ss 3, 5, 6. 
4 In Queensland and South Australia the agreement constitutes the forestry carbon right (Forest Property Act 2000 (SA) s 9; Forestry Act 
1959 (Qld) sch 3; s 61J(5) (which deems the agreement to be a profit à prendre for purposes of registration). In New South Wales, South 
Australia, Western Australia, Victoria and Tasmania the agreement is incidental or ancillary to a forestry carbon right: Conveyancing Act 
1919 (NSW) s 87A; Carbon Rights Act 2003 (WA) ss 10-16; Climate Change Act 2010 (Vic) ss 27-39; Forestry Rights Registration Act 1990 
(Tas) s 3. 
5 Mineral Resources Act 1989 (Qld) sch 1; Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) ss 500, 503; Geothermal Energy Act 
2010 (Qld) ss 216, 221; Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2009 (Qld) ss 283, 288. 
6 See Queensland Government Department of Employment, Economic Development and Innovation, Queensland’s Coal Seam Gas 
Overview (February 2012) <http://mines.industry.qld.gov.au/assets/coal-pdf/new_csg_cc.pdf> (accessed 12 October 2012). See also R 
Lyster, ‘Coal Seam Gas in the Context of Global Energy and Climate Change Scenarios’ (2012) 29(2) EPLJ 91 for a discussion of the 
projected growth of the coal seam gas industry. 
7 Further analysis of coal seam gas regulation, particularly land access issues, can be found in the following articles: K Galloway, 
‘Landowners’ vs Miners’ Property Interests: The Unsustainability of Property as Dominion’ (2012) 37(2) Alt LJ 1; G Farland and T Marshall, 
‘Coal Seam Gas (CSG) Licences and Landholders’ Rights’ (2011) 26(9) AER 226; T Hunter and M Weir, ‘Property Rights and Coal Seam Gas 
Extraction: The Modern Property Law Conundrum’ (2012)  2 Prop LR 71; N Swayne, ‘Regulating Coal Seam Gas in Queensland: Lessons in 
an Adaptive Management Approach?’ (2012) 29(2) EPLJ 163 at 172-176; TNunan, ‘Legal Issues Emerging from the Growth of the Coal Seam 
Gas Industry in Queensland’ (2006) 25 ARELJ 190 at 195-198. 
8 Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) ss 108-112.   
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authority to prospect and a petroleum lease respectively (petroleum authority
9
). A petroleum authority 
is issued to a ‘petroleum authority holder’10 (PA holder) and authorises the holder to undertake 
‘authorised activities’ within the area of the authority.11 
 
The Act allows for access to privately owned land to undertake coal seam gas projects, conditional 
upon entry into a land access agreement between the PA holder and the owner and/or occupier of 
private land.
12
 The Act distinguishes between private land inside the area of a petroleum authority 
(authority land), and private land outside the petroleum authority’s area which the PA holder may 
need to cross over in order to enter the authority land (access land). The provisions applying to 
authority land and the provisions applying to access land will be considered separately in this article. 
 
The Act gives extended effect to land access agreements. Consequential amendments were made to 
the Land Title Act 1994 (Qld) (Land Title Act), s 185(1)(h), to provide that the registered proprietor 
does not take free of the ‘interest of a petroleum authority holder under an access agreement’. An 
industry practice has developed of incorporating covenants relating to authority land and access land 
in the same agreement, even though only the latter have extended effect. As the Act does not clearly 
define the nature and contents of an access agreement, it is difficult for purchasers to assess which 
covenants in an agreement made by a predecessor will bind them. Moreover there is no requirement 
that the agreement be recorded on the land title or the petroleum register, and it may be expressed to 
be confidential to the original parties.  
 
A detailed examination of these provisions requires a layered analysis, in which we consider first, the 
enforceability of land access agreements under common law and equity, the operation of the statutory 
scheme, and finally the effect of the Land Title Act provisions.  
 
 
 
1. The nature and content of land access agreements 
 
The Act provides for two main types of agreement: an access agreement and a conduct and 
compensation agreement.
13
 The term ‘land access agreement’ is used in this article to refer where 
necessary to both types of agreement. This section will outline the circumstances in which each type 
of agreement is required, their nature, contents and principles for variation or termination. 
 
                                                          
9 ‘Petroleum authority’ is a term used in this article to encompass both an authority to prospect and a petroleum lease.  
10 ‘Petroleum authority holder’ is a term used in this article to encompass the holder of an authority to prospect or a petroleum lease.  
11 An ‘authorised activity’, for a petroleum authority, is an activity that its holder is, under this Act or the authority, entitled to carry out in 
relation to the authority: Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) s 22(1). 
12 Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) ch 5 pt 2 divs 1, 2. 
13 There is also provision for a ‘deferral agreement’ which is an agreement that the PA holder can enter the land conditional upon the 
entry into a conduct and compensation agreement at a later date: Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) ss 500A(e)(i), 
500B. 
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When is an access agreement required? 
The right of access to private land outside of the petroleum authority is conferred by section 502 of 
the Act. The section provides a PA holder with rights to cross the land if it is reasonably necessary to 
enter the area of the authority, and to carry out activities on the land that are reasonably necessary to 
allow the crossing of the land (access rights).
14
 Land over which access rights can be exercised is 
access land.
15
  
 
Before these rights can be exercised by the PA holder, they must enter into an access agreement with 
each owner and occupier of the land (if exercise of the rights is likely to have a permanent impact
16
 on 
the land) or each occupier of the land (if exercise of the rights is unlikely to have a permanent impact 
on the land).
17
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           * 
The rectangle represents one landowner’s entire property.  
 
When is a conduct and compensation agreement required? 
The right of access to land inside the petroleum authority is not expressly conferred upon the PA 
holder by the Act.
18
 The Act sets out key authorised activities for an authority to prospect and a 
                                                          
14 Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) s 502 (1). Examples given of these activities are constructing a road or track, 
and opening a gate or fence.  
15 Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) s 502(3).     
16 ‘Permanent impact’, on the land, means a continuing effect on the land or its use or a permanent or long-term adverse effect on its 
current lawful use by an occupier of the land, for example building a road: Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) s 
503(3).  
17 Rights to access the land can also be exercised where the exercise of the rights is needed to preserve life or property because of a 
dangerous situation or emergency that exists, or may exist: Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) s 503(1)(a).  
18 The Act creates a reservation to the State in land grants of the exclusive right to enter and carry out any petroleum-related activity, or 
authorise others to carry out a petroleum-related activity: Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) s 27(2)(b)(ii). This 
reservation does not expressly reserve to the State the right to authorise others to enter private land. The reservation applies to each land 
grant, under another Act, relating to land that, immediately before the grant, was unallocated State land as defined under the Land Act 
1994; and (b) that is, or was, issued on or after the commencement of the 1923 Act: s 27(1). ‘Petroleum-related activity’ means any 
activity that may be carried out under this Act by the holder of any petroleum authority: s 27(3). 
Access Land       
(outside of petroleum 
Authority)                  Petroleum 
=     Authority 
Access agreement   
required (s 503 Act) 
 
 
PA holder must cross access   land to reach land inside 
petroleum authority →→→→→→→→→→ 
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petroleum lease
19
 which do not include the right of access to private land. Despite this, the petroleum 
authority itself is likely to confer a right of access upon the PA holder.
20
   
 
Although the Act does not expressly confer a right of access to land inside the petroleum authority, it 
presumes that the right exists, and imposes requirements that a PA holder must meet before they may 
exercise it. The Act draws a distinction between preliminary activities and advanced activities. 
Preliminary activities are authorised activities with no impact, or a minor impact, on the business or 
land use activities of any landowner, such as taking soil samples and surveying.
21
 Advanced activities 
are all other activities, such as constructing a track and earthworks.
22
 Before a PA holder can enter 
land inside of the petroleum authority to carry out advanced activities, there must be a conduct and 
compensation agreement with each owner or occupier (landowner
23
) who as an ‘eligible claimant’ is 
entitled to compensation for the effects of the activities.
24
 The PA holder must also comply with other 
statutory pre-requisites for entry onto the land such as providing the landowner with an entry notice.
25
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  * 
The rectangle represents one landowner’s entire property.  
 
                                                          
19 Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) ss 31-33, 108-112. Authorised activities include exploring and testing for 
petroleum, petroleum production, construction and operation of pipelines and activities which are reasonably necessary for, or incidental 
to, an authorised activity. 
20 This is consistent with the approach of Margaret Wilson J in O’Connor & O’Connor v Arrow (Daandine) Pty Ltd [2009] QSC 432 at [48], 
[49]. 
21Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) sch 2 Dictionary. 
22 Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) sch 2 Dictionary. 
23 The term ‘landowner’ in this article will be used to include an owner and occupier of private land unless otherwise indicated.  
24 Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) ss 500, s 532(1). Note that the requirement for a conduct and compensation 
agreement is subject to the exemptions in s 500A. The parties may enter into a deferral agreement, that is, an agreement that a conduct 
and compensation agreement can be entered into after entry to the land: Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) ss 
500A(e)(i), 500B. There are other exemptions from the requirement to enter into a conduct and compensation agreement such as where 
the holder already has a right to enter the land, the entry is to preserve life or property or because of an emergency that exists or may 
exist, or the landowner is an applicant or respondent to a Land Court application to determine compensation: ss 500A(a), (e), (f).  
25 Before entering authority land to undertake preliminary or advanced activities, the PA holder must generally give the landowner an 
entry notice that describes the land to be entered, the activities to be carried out and when and where these activities will be carried out: 
Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) ss 495, 496. An entry notice is not required for entry to land if there is a conduct 
and compensation agreement relating to the land which contains a waiver of the entry notice requirement: ss 497(1)(c), 498. If there is not 
either service of an entry notice or entry into a conduct and compensation agreement containing a waiver of entry notice before entry 
onto authority land, the entry will be unlawful: O’Connor v Arrow (Daandine) Pty Ltd [2009] QSC 432 at [48], [49] (note that in this case the 
landowners were only granted a declaration that the entry onto land was unlawful and an order restraining the PA holder from continuing 
to construct a pipeline until a valid entry notice was served, but not an injunction for removal of a pipeline on the land). Ten business days 
after the entry notice is provided, the PA holder can enter the land: Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) s 495(2). 
No   Petroleum  
Petroleum  Authority 
Authority        
 
Authority Land (inside of 
 petroleum authority)  
↓   
Conduct and compensation 
agreement required 
(s 500 Act) 
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1.1 What is the nature of a land access agreement? 
The Act states that the granting of a petroleum authority does not create an interest in any land.
26
 It is 
silent upon the nature of land access agreements as an interest in land or otherwise. Land access 
agreements do not fall within any recognised category of proprietary interest although it arguable that 
they are functionally similar to an easement.
27
 The Act impliedly acknowledges that a land access 
agreement is not an easement, through provisions stating that: 
 an owner or occupier of private land outside of the petroleum authority (access land) may 
grant the PA holder an easement;
28
 and  
 a conduct and compensation agreement may be included in an easement relating to a pipeline 
licence or petroleum facility licence.
29
  
 
Furthermore, a land access agreement is not a lease or registrable restrictive covenant.
30
 There is no 
provision in the Land Title Act permitting a land access agreement to be registered or recorded on the 
land title register or the administrative advices register kept by the Registrar of Titles.
31
 
A land access agreement is fundamentally a contract between two private parties (the landowner and 
the PA holder). Although parties have the freedom to contract on their own terms, these agreements 
are given extended effect by the Act which provides that the agreements will bind successors and 
assigns of the original landowner.
32
 The interest of the PA holder under an access agreement is 
specifically excepted from the operation of the indefeasibility provision in section 184(1) of the Land 
Title Act 1994.
33
 Although the Act does not deem the interest of the PA holder under an access 
agreement to be a property right, the statutes give it an extended effect that is functionally similar to a 
property right.  The question arises as to the scope of the agreements that are capable of binding third 
parties by operation of statute. 
 
 
 
                                                          
26 Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) s 30. 
27 An access agreement is analogous to a common law easement. Access land would form the servient tenement, while the area of the 
petroleum authority would be the dominant tenement (although the PA holder is not actually owner of the freehold land). An easement 
must ‘accommodate’ the dominant tenement.’ Accommodate’ requires that there be a natural connection between the dominant and 
servient tenements and that the right must be reasonably necessary for the enjoyment of the dominant tenement: Clos Farming Estates v 
Easton [2002] NSWCA 389; Frater v Finlay (1968) 91 WN (NSW) 730 (DC) per Newton DCJ at 736. This would appear to be the case where a 
PA holder cannot gain access to the land inside the petroleum authority without crossing access land, particularly as the phrase 
‘reasonably necessary’ is used in the legislation defining access rights: Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) ss 502, 
503. Questions relevant to whether a right over land is capable of forming the subject matter of an easement are whether the rights are 
too wide and vague, whether such rights would amount to rights of joint occupation or substantially deprive the servient owner of 
possession, and whether the rights constitute mere rights of recreation with no utility or benefit: Re Ellenborough Park [1956] 1 Ch 131 
(CA) per Evershed MR at 164. Under these principles it would appear that access rights over access land are capable of forming the subject 
matter of a grant of an easement. 
28 Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) s 506(4). 
29 Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) s 533(4). 
30 Restrictive covenants between private parties are not registrable in Queensland: Land Title Act 1994 (Qld) s 97A; Property Law Act 1974 
(Qld) s 4.  
31 Land Title Act 1994 (Qld) ss 28, 29, 34. Section 34 arguably confers discretion upon the Registrar to record a land access agreement on 
the administrative advices register by providing that it may contain ‘information that the registrar considers necessary or desirable for the 
effective or efficient operation of the register.’  
32 Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) ss 507, 537E.  
33 Land Title Act 1994 (Qld) s 185(1)(h). 
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1.2 What are the contents of land access agreements? 
Land access agreements are negotiated between the PA holder and the landowner on a bilateral 
basis.
34
 The Act sets out parameters for the content of both an access agreement and a conduct and 
compensation agreement. 
 
1.2.1 Contents of an access agreement 
An access agreement is an agreement regarding the crossing of land outside of the petroleum authority 
to access the petroleum authority land, and carrying out of activities on the land that are reasonably 
necessary to allow such crossing.
35
 The agreement will presumably set out where, when and how 
often the PA holder crosses the land. It is also likely to deal with the method of crossing the land and 
incidental matters such as the constructing of roads or tracks, and the opening of gates or fences.
36
 
The Act itself contains little guidance on the contents of an access agreement, apart from providing 
that it may include a waiver of entry notice, and may include a compensation agreement in relation to 
the exercise or future exercise of access rights by the PA holder.
37
  
 
1.2.2 Contents of a conduct and compensation agreement 
A conduct and compensation agreement must address how and when the land within the petroleum 
authority is to be accessed, and how authorised activities under the petroleum authority are to be 
carried out on the land.
38
 Given there is no express legislative right of entry to authority land, it may 
be arguable that the terms of the agreement setting out how and when the land is to be accessed confer 
a right of access upon the PA holder. However this legislative guideline is contained within a division 
of the Act dealing solely with compensation matters.
39
 Terms setting out particulars of access will 
form part of an agreement which has the primary purpose of addressing the PA holder’s compensation 
liability to the landowner.
40
 The better view is that particulars of access in the agreement define the 
agreed basis for compensation and do not constitute a new right.   
 
A conduct and compensation agreement must address the PA holder’s compensation liability to the 
landowner.
41
 Compensation liability is the liability of the PA holder to compensate the landowner for 
any compensatable effect he or she suffers that is caused by relevant authorised activities.
42
  
Compensatable effects come under five broad heads:
43
 
 deprivation of possession of the land’s surface; 
                                                          
34 Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) ss 503(1)(b), 533(1). 
35 Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) s 503(2). 
36 Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) s 502(1)(b) note to section. 
37 Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) ss 506(2), (3). 
38 Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) ss 533(1)(a),(b). 
39 Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) pt 1, div 5 headed ‘compensation other than for notifiable road uses’. The 
Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) s 14(1) provides that a heading to a division is part of the Act. 
40 Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) ss 532, 533.  
41 Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) ss 533(1)(c), 534(1)(a). 
42 Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) s 532(2).  
43 Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) s 532(4). 
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 diminunition of the land’s value;44 
 diminunition of the use made of the land or any improvement on it; 
 severance of any part of the land from other parts of the land or from other land of the 
landowner; 
 any cost, damage or loss arising from the carrying out of authorised activities on the land. 
 
Compensatable effects also include consequential damages the landowner incurs because of one of the 
abovementioned matters, and accounting, legal or valuation costs the landowner necessarily and 
reasonably incurs in negotiating the agreement.
45
 The following matters are discretionary:  
 the agreement may relate to all or part of the liability or future liability;46 
 the agreement may extend the PA holder’s compensation liability or any future compensation 
liability to any renewal of the petroleum authority;
47
 and 
 the agreement may provide for monetary or non-monetary compensation.48 
 
The following clause, and most of the other examples in this article, is taken from the Queensland 
Government Standard Conduct and Compensation Agreement.  
 
Example of clause in a conduct and compensation agreement 
1.1  The PA Holder must provide the Compensation to the Landowner in accordance with 
 schedule 3.   
1.2 If the PA Holder does not pay a sum of money under this Agreement at or before the time for 
payment, the PA Holder must pay the Landowner interest at the standard default contract 
 rate published by the Queensland Law Society at the time payment was due. 
 
Rights, liabilities and obligations that are set out in the Act or in the Land Access Code
49
 are also 
commonly restated in a conduct and compensation agreement.
50
 The Act does not expressly limit the 
                                                          
44 The recent case of Peabody West Burton v Mason [2012] QLC 23 considered the compensation payable under this head for exploration 
activities. It was held that ‘the landholder is compensated for the actual damage that the explorer does to the landholder’s property in 
actually carrying out the exploration activities’ at [27]. Diminution in value of the land did not include diminution in value of the land 
arising from the risk of the grant of a mining lease and subsequent coal extraction, the ‘heightened perception’ that mining would occur 
due to mining activity on nearby properties and new coal infrastructure in the area, the current coal mining boom and the aversion in the 
rural property market to the risk of mining: at [33], [37]. 
45 Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) s 532(4)(b).  
46 Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) s 533(3). 
47 Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) s 534(2)(a). 
48 Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) s 534(2)(b)(i). 
49 The Land Access Code, which is incorporated by a regulation, imposes certain mandatory conditions on petroleum authorities relating to 
the conduct of authorised activities on private land: Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) s 24A; Petroleum and Gas 
(Production and Safety) Regulation 2004 (Qld) s 4A; sch 1A. These conditions are generally designed to minimise the burden of the 
authorised activities on the landowner. 
50 For example, the landowner’s duty not to obstruct a PA holder from entering or crossing the land or carrying out authorised activities 
without reasonable excuse (Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) s 805; Queensland Government Department of 
Employment, Economic Development and Innovation, Standard Conduct and Compensation Agreement cl 11.2 (27 August 2010) 
<http://mines.industry.qld.gov.au/mining/landholder-information.htm> (accessed 12 October 2012) (‘Standard Conduct and 
Compensation Agreement’)) and that the conduct and compensation agreement is binding upon each party’s successors and assigns: 
Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) s 537E; Standard Conduct and Compensation Agreement, cl 19.1. 
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matters that may be provided for in a conduct and compensation agreement,
51
 although its terms 
cannot be inconsistent with the Act, petroleum authority or a mandatory provision of the Land Access 
Code.
52
 Other limitations on the contents of a conduct and compensation agreement may be implied 
from the scope, subject matter and purpose of the Act, and from the provision in section 533(1) that 
the agreement is ‘about’ the three matters listed therein. 
 
Conduct and compensation agreements are usually drafted by or for the PA holder and submitted to 
the landowner. They are likely to include terms that are not expressly provided for in the Act or the 
Land Access Code. For example, most conduct and compensation agreements will contain clauses 
requiring confidentiality of both parties (apart from disclosure to certain parties such as financial 
advisors and potential purchasers of the land)
53
 and clauses aimed at restricting the PA holder’s 
compensation liability.  
 
Example of clause in a conduct and compensation agreement 
1.1 Neither party may disclose the Compensation to another person without the other party’s prior 
written consent, which consent must not be unreasonably withheld.   
1.2 Notwithstanding the preceding clause, a party may make the following disclosures without the 
consent of the other party: 
(a) to the party’s legal or financial advisers; 
(b) to the party’s other consultants; 
(c) to a potential purchaser of the Land or an interest in the Tenement; 
(d) to a related body corporate, as defined in section 50 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth); 
(e) required by law, including disclosure to any stock exchange; and 
(f) as ordered or required by any court, tribunal or authority. 
 
 
1.3 How can land access agreements be varied or terminated? 
The circumstances in which a land access agreement may be varied or terminated are limited. The 
agreement itself may provide for a process by which it may be varied.
54
 Additionally, either party may 
apply to the Land Court for variation of an access agreement
55
 or a review of the original 
                                                          
51 Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) s 534(3) states ‘this section does not limit the matters that may be provided 
for in a conduct and compensation agreement’ [our emphasis]. 
52 Terms will be unenforceable to the extent of any inconsistency: Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) s 533(2).  
53 Standard Conduct and Compensation Agreement, above n 50, cl 20. 
54 Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) ss 509(4) (access agreements), 534(2)(b)(ii) (conduct and compensation 
agreements). The example provided in s 534(2)(b)(ii) of a process for amendment is: “a conduct and compensation agreement may 
provide for compensation to be reviewed upon a material change in circumstances including a change in the extent of activities required 
under a later development plan for a petroleum lease”. See also Standard Conduct and Compensation Agreement, above n 50, cl 7. 
55 Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld s 509. 
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compensation (under a conduct and compensation agreement)
56
 where there is a material change in 
circumstances.  
 
The phrase ‘material change in circumstances’ is difficult to define, although guidance can be taken 
from the limited judicial interpretation available.  In determining whether a material change in 
circumstances has occurred, it appears that the starting point is to examine the circumstances as they 
existed at the time the authority was granted, and then to examine the circumstances as they exist at 
the time of the hearing.
57
 ‘Circumstance’ is a word of wide import which includes all facts, matters 
and conduct relevant to an authorisation.
58
 
 
Judicial interpretation indicates that a material change in circumstances will be a change that is 
pertinent to what compensation should be awarded, not a change that is of substantial import to the 
compensation that should be awarded.
59
 Once a pertinent change is established, it can be considered 
whether it is of such significance that any amendment to the original compensation is justified.
60
 A 
material change in circumstances will occur where, for example, there is a change in the operating 
conditions for a resources authority,
61
 an extension of the term of the original resources authority,
62
 or 
a change in a mining program that is significant enough to require a change in the environmental 
authority.
63
 The Act contains no legal mechanism for variation of a land access agreement in the 
absence of a material change in circumstances. 
 
Notably, the Act does not provide for termination of an access agreement or conduct and 
compensation agreement in any circumstances. Land access agreements may include a term that they 
cannot be terminated for a breach of the agreement,
64
 although common law rights of termination are 
likely to apply unless precluded by the agreement itself. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
56 Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) s 537C. Note also jurisdiction of the Land Court to imply or vary conditions of 
an agreement or make any order it considers necessary: ss 537DB, DC.  
57 Re Alliance Petroleum Australia Pty Ltd & Others [1997] ACompT 2 (14 October 1997) at 16 per Lockhart J (President), Dr M Brunt and Dr 
B Aldrich; referred to with approval in Re Benney v Vella [2003] QLRT 80 at [8]. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Hicks v Graham [2004] QLRT 47 at [36]. 
60 Hicks v Graham [2004] QLRT 47 at [36]. 
61 Hicks v Graham [2004] QLRT 47 at [29]-[31]. The case concerned a mining lease but would presumably also apply to a petroleum lease as 
both are a ‘resources authority’.  
62 Re Benney v Vella [2003] QLRT 80 at [10]. The case concerned a mining lease but would presumably also apply to a petroleum lease as 
both are a ‘resources authority’.  
63 Slater v Appleton [2012] QLC 7 (24 February 2012) at [35]-[36]. 
64 Standard Conduct and Compensation Agreement, above n 50, cl 24.3. 
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2. Traditional legal rules for covenants relating to land 
 
Land access agreements may remain in place for a number of years. This will depend upon the length 
of the agreement, which may be defined as ‘the term of the tenement’. If ‘tenement’ is defined in the 
agreement to encompass any renewals or transitions of a petroleum authority,
65
 the term of the 
agreement could be extended significantly.
66
 While the original parties to the agreement remain in 
their respective roles as PA holder and landowner, they are entitled to enforce covenants in a land 
access agreement against each other.  
 
In the course of a long-term land access agreement, the original landowner may wish to sell, lease or 
mortgage the land. Once the land is transferred, leased or mortgaged to a third party, the doctrine of 
privity of contract will prevent enforcement of the agreement by or against the third party.
67
 In certain 
circumstances, however, common law rules and the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) (Property Law Act) 
have altered the doctrine of privity of contract to allow enforcement of covenants relating to land by 
and against a third party. The following section outlines the relevant common law and statutory rules 
for the enforcement of covenants relating to land and their application to land access agreements.  
 
2.1 Enforcing the benefit of a covenant relating to land 
2.1.1 At law 
A third party who obtains an interest in the land will not be privy to a land access agreement between 
the original landowner and the PA holder. Regardless, the third party may enforce the benefit of 
covenants in the agreement against the PA holder where the following criteria are satisfied: 
(a) The covenant touches and concerns the land to be benefited;68 
(b)  The covenant identifies the benefited land;69 
(c) The covenant is intended to be for the benefit of the successors of the covenantee (original 
landowner);
70
 and 
(d) The third party is a successor in title to the original covenantee and has a legal interest in the 
benefited land.
71
 
 
                                                          
65 This form of clause is authorised by the Act: “A conduct and compensation agreement may...extend the holder’s compensation liability 
to the claimant or any future compensation liability that the holder may have to the claimant to any renewal of the petroleum authority”: 
Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) s 534(2)(a). 
66 For example, where a twelve year authority to prospect is transitioned into a thirty year petroleum lease, which is then renewed, it is 
feasible that a land access agreement could run for up to 72 years. Twelve years is the maximum term for an authority to prospect: 
Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) s 42(1)(b); thirty years is the maximum term for a petroleum lease: s 123(2)(b); 
thirty years is the maximum term for renewal of a petroleum lease, but only if the original term of the lease was thirty years: s 164. 
67 Trident General Insurance Co Ltd v McNiece Bros Pty Ltd (1988) 165 CLR 107; Northern Sandblasting Pty Ltd v Harris (1997) 188 CLR 313 
at 333-4 per Brennan CJ. 
68 Re Rakita’s Application [1971] Qd R 59 at 60; Dewar v Goodman [1907] 1 KB 612 at 620; Sandhurst Trustees Ltd v Australian Country 
Cinemas Pty Ltd (2006) ANZ Conv R 508 at [18]. 
69 The land which is benefited by the covenant must be ascertainable by reference to the terms of the deed read in light of the 
surrounding circumstances: Smith and Snipes Hall Farm Ltd v River Douglas Catchment Board [1949] 2 KB 500 at 508 per Tucker LJ. 
70 Federated Homes Ltd v Mill Lodge Properties [1980] 1 All ER 371 at 377 (CA) per Brightman LJ; Simmons v Lee [1998] 2 Qd R 671 at 671. 
71 Smith & Snipes Hall Farm v River Douglas Catchment Board [1949] 2 KB 500 at 516; Federated Homes Ltd v Mill Lodge Properties [1980] 
1 All ER 371 which held that due to the effect of the English equivalent of s 53 of the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld), the legal estate can be 
other than a fee simple interest, such as a leasehold estate. 
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Section 53(1) of the Property Law Act deems covenants relating to the land of the covenantee to be 
made with the covenantee’s successors in title and persons deriving title under the covenantee or the 
covenantee’s successors in title. This section provides a statutory satisfaction of the requirement that 
the covenant be intended to benefit successors of the original landowner.
72
 The phrase ‘relating to the 
land’ used in section 53(1) imports the ‘touches and concerns the land’ test.73 The covenant must also 
touch and concern the land in order for the benefit of the covenant to run with the land.  A covenant 
will touch and concern the land where it affects the nature, quality, mode of user or value of the land, 
and is not expressed as a personal obligation.
74
 Covenants such as the following have been held to 
touch and concern the land: a covenant to repair and maintain the banks of a river in order to prevent 
the flooding of the benefited land;
75
 a covenant that the covenantor would not withhold consent to a 
sale or transfer of a business on the land;
76
 and a covenant for quiet enjoyment of the land.
77
 
 
Covenants in a land access agreement which affect the nature, quality, mode of user or value of the 
landowner’s property, and are not personal obligations between the PA holder and the landowner, will 
touch and concern the land. Furthermore a land access agreement will invariably identify the land to 
be benefited.
78
 It is likely that a third party who succeeds or derives title from the original landowner 
will be able to enforce the benefit of covenants which touch and concern the land against the PA 
holder. 
 
Notably, the benefit of covenants relating to land can run at law even where there is no servient 
tenement to be affected.
79
 No servient tenement exists for covenants in a conduct and compensation 
agreement, because the PA holder’s interest is over the landowner’s property. The abovementioned 
principles will apply for enforcement of the benefit of covenants regardless of whether they are 
positive or negative.
80
 
 
Example 
The PA holder will keep all gates, tracks, buildings and other improvements erected and made upon 
the land in good and substantial repair as the same were in at the date of the agreement. 
 
This covenant affects the quality and value of the property by requiring structures on the land to be 
kept in good repair. It is not a personal obligation between the PA holder and the landowner. It 
touches and concerns the land and will be enforceable against a PA holder by a third party who 
succeeds or derives title from the original landowner. 
                                                          
72 Provided that the covenant touches and concerns the land: Federated Homes Ltd v Mill Lodge Properties [1980] 1 All ER 371 at 377 (CA) 
per Brightman LJ; Simmons v Lee [1998] 2 Qd R 671 at 671. 
73 Sandhurst Trustees Ltd v Australian Country Cinemas Pty Ltd (2006) ANZ Conv R 508 at [31]; Simmons v Lee [1998] 2 Qd R 674. 
74 P&A Swift Investments (a firm) v Combined English Stores plc [1989] AC 623 at 638.  
75 Smith & Snipes Hall Farm v River Douglas Catchment Board [1949] 2 KB 500. 
76 Re Rakita’s Application [1971] Qd R 59. 
77 Dewar v Goodman [1907] 1 KB 612 at 620. 
78 See for example Standard Conduct and Compensation Agreement, above n 50, Reference Schedule, Item 4 ‘Land’. 
79 Smith & Snipes Hall Farm v River Douglas Catchment Board [1949] 2 KB 500 at 518; Prior’s Case (1368) YB 42 Ed 111 at 114.  
80 Prior’s Case (1368) YB 42 Ed 111 at 114.  
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Example 
The PA holder must provide the compensation to the landowner in accordance with schedule 3 
(setting out, for example, a payment of $500 per annum per well head upon the land). 
 
This covenant is a personal obligation between the PA holder and the landowner. It does not affect the 
nature, quality, mode of user or value of the land itself and therefore does not touch and concern the 
land. It will not be enforceable against the PA holder by a third party who succeeds or derives title 
from the original landowner. 
 
 
2.1.2 In equity 
Similar principles apply to determine whether the benefit of a covenant runs with the land in equity. 
The covenant must touch and concern the land of the original covenantee
81
 (original landowner) and 
must be expressly annexed or statutorily annexed to the land.
82
 
 
Express annexation will occur where there is a clear expression of intention in the instrument creating 
the covenant that it should run with the land for the benefit of which it is given.
83
 This intention may 
be found where the covenant is expressed to be made for the benefit of specified land, or the covenant 
is expressed to be made with the covenantee, and the covenantee’s heirs and assigns, in the 
covenantee’s capacity as owner of the land.84  
 
It is likely that such an expression of intention will be found in a land access agreement. The Standard 
Conduct and Compensation Agreement provides that ‘the landholder warrants that it is the owner and 
occupier...of the land’85 and ‘a party includes its executors, administrators, liquidators, successors and 
permitted assigns’.86 Combined, these clauses indicate that the landowner is covenanting in his or her 
capacity as owner of the land, on behalf of his or her successors and permitted assigns. Additionally, 
the land benefited must be identified or identifiable from the covenant.
87
 Identification of the land will 
invariably be included in a land access agreement.
88
 
 
                                                          
81 Re Union of London and Smith’s Bank Ltd’s Conveyance [1933] Ch 611 (CA); Re Ballard’s Conveyance [1937] Ch 473. 
82 It may also be expressly assigned or run with the land by virtue of the doctrine of the scheme of development (A Bradbrook and S 
MacCallum, Bradbrook and Neave’s Easements and Restrictive Covenants, LexisNexisButterworths, 3rd ed, 2010, p 315) but these methods 
are not relevant for the purposes of this discussion.  
83 Ibid 316. 
84 Drake v Gray [1936] Ch 451 at 466 per Greene LJ; Rogers v Hosegood [1900] 2 Ch 388 (CA). 
85 Standard Conduct and Compensation Agreement, above n 50, cl 5.2. 
86 Standard Conduct and Compensation Agreement, above n 50, cl 1.2(d). 
87 Re Pirie and the Real Property Act (1961) 79 WN (NSW) 701; Clem Smith Nominees Pty Ltd v Farrelly (1978) 20 SASR 227.  
88 See for example Standard Conduct and Compensation Agreement, above n 49, Reference Schedule, Item 4 ‘Land’. 
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Statutory annexation of the benefit of a covenant in equity is achieved through section 53(1) of the 
Property Law Act.
89
 However this section only applies to a covenant which touches and concerns the 
land to which it is expressed to be annexed.
90
 
 
It appears that the benefit of covenants in a land access agreement which touch and concern the land 
will run with the land in equity. 
 
2.1.3 Section 55 of the Property Law Act 
Section 55 is also relevant to the enforcement of the benefit of covenants by third parties. The section 
provides: 
“A promisor who, for a valuable consideration moving from the promisee, promises to do or to refrain from doing 
an act or acts for the benefit of a beneficiary shall, upon acceptance by the beneficiary, be subject to a duty 
enforceable by the beneficiary to perform that promise.”91 
 
‘Acceptance’ means an assent by words or conduct communicated by the beneficiary to the promisor, 
within a reasonable time of the promise coming to the notice of the beneficiary.
 92
 A ‘beneficiary’ is a 
third party who is identified and in existence at the time of acceptance.
93
 Brennan CJ held in Northern 
Sandblasting v Harris (1997) 188 CLR 313 that ‘the identity of the beneficiary must be ascertainable 
from the terms of the promise made. The beneficiary is not any person who, in the event, would have 
been benefited had the promise been fulfilled’.94 Conversely, Kirby J (Gaudron J agreeing) took a 
wider view and held that section 55 would extend to the enforcement of a lessor’s statutory duty on 
behalf of a child (the ‘beneficiary’) whose ‘acceptance’ was communicated through her conduct in 
entering into leased premises with her lessee parents.
95
 
 
A clause in a land access agreement providing that a party includes its successors and permitted 
assigns
96
 may allow a third party who succeeds or is assigned title from the original landowner to 
enforce the benefit of covenants in the agreement as a ‘beneficiary’ pursuant to section 55. This third 
party would presumably be identified and in existence at time of acceptance as the successor or assign 
of an interest in the relevant land. Bradbrook and Neave state: 
                                                          
89 Federated Homes Ltd v Mill Lodge Properties [1980] 1 All ER 371 at 379 (CA) per Brightman LJ; followed in Australia in Midland Brick Co 
Pty Ltd v Welsh (2006) 32 WAR 287 at [282] per Hasluck J. Note however the High Court specifically declined to consider this question in 
Forestview Nominees v Perpetual Trustees WA Ltd (1998) 193 CLR 154 at 171. 
90 P&A Swift Investments (a firm) v Combined English Stores plc [1989] AC 632 at 638; Clem Smith Nominees Pty Ltd v Farrelly (1978) 20 
SASR 227. 
91 Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) s 55(1).  
92 Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) s 55(6). For example where a beneficiary does not accept the benefit of a promise for five months after 
receiving notice of the identity of the promisor, this will not constitute sufficient acceptance pursuant to section 55: Re Davies [1989] 1 Qd 
R 48 at 49 per Macrossan J. 
93 Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) s 55(6).  
94 Northern Sandblasting v Harris (1997) 188 CLR 313 at 579 per Brennan CJ. 
95 Ibid at 412-413 per Kirby J. 
96 See, for example, Standard Conduct and Compensation Agreement, above n 50, cl 1.2(d). 
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It is not clear whether Brennan CJ’s interpretation of section 55 would permit successors in title to the 
covenantee, referred to in the terms of the covenant, to rely on the section. By contrast, under Kirby 
and Gaudron JJ’s approach they would appear to be covered.97 
 
In any event, the third party would need to communicate their acceptance of the benefit of covenants 
in a land access agreement within a reasonable time of becoming aware of the agreement. The 
enforcement of the benefit of covenants under section 55 does not appear to be restricted to covenants 
that touch and concern the land. 
 
Example 
Clause 1: In this Agreement, unless the context otherwise requires: 
(a) a party includes its executors, administrators, liquidators, successors and permitted assigns. 
 
Clause 2: Indemnity 
2.1 The PA Holder indemnifies and will keep indemnified the Landowner from and against any Claim 
on the terms of this clause 2, except to the extent the Claim: 
(a) is settled by Compensation or other payments contemplated in this Agreement; or 
(b) is caused or contributed to by the negligence or act or omission of the Landowner or its 
Associates. 
 
It is arguable that the identity of a third party who succeeds or is assigned title from the original 
landowner is ascertainable from the terms of the agreement (Clause 1) and the third party will be 
classified as a ‘beneficiary’ of the indemnity covenant (Clause 2). Provided that the third party 
accepts the benefit of clause 2 within a reasonable time of the agreement coming to his or her notice,  
he or she may be able to enforce the clause against the PA holder under section 55 of the Property 
Law Act. Section 55 may allow enforcement of Clause 2 although it is a personal covenant and does 
not touch or concern the land. 
 
To summarise, it is likely that a third party who succeeds or derives title from the original landowner 
will be able to enforce the benefit of covenants in a land access agreement against the PA holder, 
provided they touch and concern the land. This conclusion can be reached through a combination of 
the common law principles and section 53 of the Property Law Act.  
 
It is less likely, but remains possible, that a third party who succeeds or derives title from the original 
landowner will be able to enforce the benefit of covenants which do not touch and concern the land. 
The only possible avenue for enforcement of these covenants is section 55 of the Property Law Act. 
Enforcement under this section will depend upon whether the third party who succeeds or derives title 
from the original landowner is a ‘beneficiary’ within the meaning of the section.  
                                                          
97 Bradbrook and MacCallum, above n 85, 307. 
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2.2 Enforcing the burden of a covenant relating to land 
Different principles apply for the enforcement of the burden of covenants in a land access agreement 
against a third party who obtains an interest in the land.
98
 For these purposes, the PA holder would be 
the party attempting to enforce the burden of covenants against a third party. 
 
There is a legal distinction drawn between the enforcement of the burden of positive and negative 
covenants. Positive covenants require an act to be done or money to be expended, while negative 
covenants require the covenantor to refrain from doing an act or using land in a particular manner. A 
court will consider the substance of the covenant rather than its form in determining whether it 
imposes positive or negative obligations.
99 
 
 
The general rule for positive covenants is that the burden cannot be enforced against a successive 
covenantor (eg a successive landowner) at law or in equity.
100
 Neither will section 53(2) of the 
Property Law Act
101
 make the burden of a positive covenant enforceable against a successive 
covenantor.
102
 
 
Example 
If the Landowner materially changes the current or proposed use of the Land at any time after the 
Agreement Date, the Landowner must notify the PA Holder in writing as soon as practicable.    
 
This covenant imposes a positive burden on the landowner by requiring him or her to do an act (notify 
the PA holder in writing). As it is a positive covenant, it will not be enforceable against a third party 
who succeeds or derives title from the original landowner.  
 
The burden of negative covenants cannot be enforced at law, despite the enactment of section 53(2) of 
the Property Law Act.
103
 However, the burden of covenants can be enforced in equity where the 
following criteria are satisfied: 
                                                          
98 Such as a fee simple, leasehold or mortgage interest. 
99 Shepherd Homes Ltd v Sandham (No 2) [1971] 2 All ER 1267; Westpoint Corporation v Registrar of Titles [2004] WASC 189; Fitt v Luxury 
Developments Pty Ltd [2000] VSC 258. 
100 Rhone v Stephens [1994] 2 AC 310: this case held that the burden of a covenant to keep a roof in repair was not enforceable against the 
defendants as successors in title to the covenantor, even though the defendants took the benefit of easements of support and eavesdrop 
contained in the document imposing the burden. Rural View Developments v Fastfort [2011] 1 Qd R 35 at [15]: “the burden of a positive 
covenant does not run with the land unless the covenant itself amounts to the grant of some easement, rent-charge or some estate or 
interest in the land. In particular, “a mere covenant to repair, or to do something of that kind, does not … run with the land in such a way 
as to bind those who may acquire it”. Although it is possible for the burden of a positive covenant to run with the land, it will only be 
allowed in limited circumstances such as where the successive covenantor elects to do a certain act and the carrying out of the positive 
covenant is a once-off event as opposed to an ongoing obligation: see Rufa v Cross [1981] Qd R 365; Frater v Finlay (1968) 91 WN (NSW) 
730. 
101 Section 53(2): ‘A covenant relating to any land of a covenantor or capable of being bound by the covenantor, shall, unless a contrary 
intention is expressed, be deemed to be made by the covenantor on behalf of the covenantor, the covenantor’s successors in title and the 
persons deriving title under the covenantor or the covenantor’s successors in title, and, shall have effect as if such successors and other 
persons were expressed.’ 
102 Rural View Developments Pty Ltd v Fastfort Pty Ltd [2011] 1 Qd R 35 at 35; Rhone v Stephens [1994] 2 AC 310 at 321-2.  
103 Unless there is a landlord-tenant relationship: Austerberry v Corporation of Oldham (1885) 29 Ch D 750 (CA).  
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(a) the covenant is negative;104  
(b) the burden of the covenant is intended to run with the land so as to bind successors in title; 
(c) the covenant is given for the benefit of land of the covenantee, not simply for the benefit of 
the covenantee;
105
  
(d) the covenant touches and concerns the benefited land;106and 
(e) the successive covenantor takes their interest with notice of the covenant.107 
 
The second requirement will be satisfied by section 53(2) of the Property Law Act which provides 
that a covenant relating to any land is deemed to be made with the covenantor’s successors in title. 
This section alone will not pass the burden of the covenant to successive covenantors. All of the 
abovementioned requirements must be fulfilled,
108
 including the requirement of touching and 
concerning the land, which is imported by the phrase ‘a covenant relating to any land’.109 
 
For a covenant to be given for the benefit of the covenantee’s land, the covenantee must hold a 
sufficient interest in the benefited land.
110
 A sufficient interest will include a fee simple or leasehold 
interest, but may not extend to lesser interests such as the interest of a mortgagee of Torrens land.
111
 
Mere statutory rights over the benefited land are insufficient.
112
 A PA holder’s interest in the land 
covered by the petroleum authority (benefited land) is similarly limited to statutory rights and 
powers
113
 and is expressly stated not to be an interest in the land.
114
 By analogy, it appears doubtful 
that the PA holder will have a sufficient interest in the benefited land to support enforcement of a 
covenant against a successive landowner on the basis of the criteria above.  
 
The covenant must touch and concern the land, meaning it must affect the nature, quality, mode of 
user or value of the covenantee’s land, and not be expressed as a personal obligation.115 Additionally 
the successive covenantor must take their interest in the land with notice of the covenant. The 
application of these principles is demonstrated in the following example.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
104 Marquess of Zetland v Driver [1939] 1 Ch 1 at 8 per Farwell J.  
105 Rogers v Hosegood [1900] 2 Ch 388; Forestview Nominees Pty Ltd v Perpetual Trustees WA Ltd (1998) 193 CLR 154.  
106 See Langdale Pty Ltd v Sollas [1959] VR 634; Clem Smith Nominees Pty Ltd v Farrelly (1978) 20 SASR 227. 
107 Tulk v Moxhay [1848-60] All ER Rep 9; Clem Smith Nominees Pty Ltd v Farrelly (1978) 20 SASR 227; Forestview Nominees Pty Ltd v 
Perpetual Trustees WA Ltd (1998) 193 CLR 154; Midland Brick Co Pty Ltd v Welsh (2006) 32 WAR 287. 
108 Sefton v Tophams Ltd [1967] 1 AC 60 at 73 per Lord Wilberforce; Rhone v Stephens [1994] 2 AC 310 at 321-2. 
109 Sandhurst Trustees Ltd v Australian Country Cinemas Pty Ltd (2006) ANZ Conv R 508 at [31]. 
110 London County Council v Allen [1914-15] All ER Rep 1008. 
111 Bradbrook and MacCallum, above n 86, 393-394; Clem Smith Nominees Pty Ltd v Farrelly (1978) 20 SASR 227 at 238-40 per Bray CJ; at 
248-9 per Hogarth J; at 256 per Zelling J. 
112 Statutory rights were not a sufficient interest in the land to support the restrictive covenant where the burdened land had passed into 
the hands of a successor in title of the covenantor: Commissioner for Main Roads v BP (Australia) Ltd [1964-5] NSWR 521. 
113 See, for example, Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) ss 108-112.  
114 Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) s 30. 
115 P&A Swift Investments (a firm) v Combined English Stores plc [1989] AC 623 at 638.  
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Example 
The Landowner will not hinder access to and from the Land by the PA Holder and its Associates in 
accordance with this Agreement and in compliance with the Relevant Act. 
 
This covenant places a negative burden on the landowner by restricting his or her ability to hinder 
access to their land. It affects the use and value of the land in the area of the petroleum authority (the 
benefited land), and therefore touches and concerns the land.
116
 However the PA holder will not have 
a sufficient interest in the benefited land to enforce the burden of the covenant against a successive 
landowner.  The burden of the covenant will not run with the land at law, in equity or under the 
Property Law Act. 
 
 
3. Enforcement of land access agreements under the Act against third parties 
 
The traditional legal rules outlined above will prima facie apply to determine the enforceability of 
covenants in land access agreements. In the context of freehold land these rules are subject to the 
operation of the Land Title Act and any alterations to the rules effected by the Act. The following 
section examines the interaction of the Act with the rules relating to covenants and the indefeasibility 
provisions of the Land Title Act.  
  
3.1. Enforcement of access agreements against third parties 
 
Section 507 of the Act states: 
An access agreement binds the parties to it and each of their personal representatives, successors in title 
and assigns. 
 
The section is brief. It makes no distinction between the benefit and the burden of covenants, 
covenants that touch and concern the land and covenants that do not, or covenants that impose a 
negative burden and covenants that impose a positive burden. Section 507 appears to intend that all 
covenants in an access agreement will be enforceable by and against third parties, regardless of 
whether the covenant imposes a positive or negative burden, touches and concerns the land or is a 
personal obligation only. Pursuant to the section, the PA holder is entitled to enforce the burden of all 
covenants in an access agreement against a third party who succeeds or derives title from the original 
landowner. This situation represents a substantial departure from the traditional common law and 
Property Law Act rules.  
 
                                                          
116 There is arguably an analogy between this covenant and a covenant for quiet enjoyment, which has been held to touch and concern the 
land: Dewar v Goodman [1907] 1 KB 612 at 620. 
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Further to this, the Land Title Act contains several relevant provisions. Section 184(1), the 
‘indefeasibility’ provision, provides that ‘a registered proprietor of an interest in a lot holds the 
interest subject to registered interests affecting the lot but free from all other interests’. Section 185(1) 
provides that a registered proprietor of a lot does not obtain the benefit of section 184 for the 
following interests in relation to the lot:   
(h) the interest of a petroleum authority holder under the Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) 
Act 2004 under an access agreement under that Act that— 
(i) was made before the registered proprietor became the registered proprietor of the lot; and 
(ii) under that Act, binds the registered proprietor. 
 
Section 185(1)(h) makes it clear that the interest of the PA holder under an access agreement will be 
an exception to indefeasibility, but does not define or specify the scope of the ‘interest’ that will gain 
the benefits of indefeasibility.  
 
3.1.1 What is the ‘interest’ of a PA holder under an access agreement? 
The question arises whether a PA holder has an ‘interest’ in land under an access agreement. ‘Interest’ 
is not defined in the Land Title Act or the Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act, but section 
36(1) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) (the interpretation provision) (Acts Interpretation Act) 
defines ‘interest, in relation to land or other property’ as:  
(a) a legal or equitable estate in the land or other property [‘the first limb’]; or 
(b) a right, power or privilege over, or in relation to, the land or other property [‘the second limb’].117 
 
The application of this interpretation provision may be displaced, wholly or partly, by a contrary 
intention appearing in the Land Title Act or any other Act.
118
 The interpretation provision  will apply 
to the Land Title Act except so far as the context or subject matter otherwise indicates or requires.
119
 
In Bradshaw v Henderson [2010] QCA 8, the question was whether the interpretation provision was 
displaced in relation to the term ‘interest in land’ in sections 11 and 59 of the Property Law Act. The 
provisions specify written formalities for the creation of an ‘interest in land’ (s 11) and for a contract 
for the sale or disposition of an ‘interest in land’ (s 59). Based on examination of the contexts in 
which the term ‘interest in land’ was used elsewhere in the Property Law Act120 it was held that 
‘interest in land’ under sections 11 and 59 was used in the more restrictive sense of the first limb of 
the interpretation provision, and did not extend to the wider sense conveyed in the second limb.
121
 In 
Mijo Developments v Royal Agnes Waters Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 199 the question was whether 
section 122 of the Land Title Act, which provides that ‘a caveat may be lodged by... a person claiming 
an interest in a lot’, entitled a party to lodge a caveat in respect of a claimed right to have the land 
reconveyed. The parties agreed that both limbs of the definition of ‘interest’ in the interpretation 
                                                          
117 Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) s 36. 
118 Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) s 4. 
119 Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) s 32A. 
120 Ss 7, 8, 30. 
121 Bradshaw v Henderson [2010] QCA 8 at [23]. 
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provision were to be applied to the term ‘interest’ in section 122 of the Land Title Act.122 The dispute 
related to whether the requirement of the second limb was satisfied. Hammerschlag J said that the 
words ‘in relation to’ in the second limb of the interpretation provision were of wide import, and that 
where a party asserted a right to have the land reconveyed, there was a sufficient connection between 
the right asserted and the land itself.
123
 
 
Additionally, a person’s contractual licence to use land was held to be ‘an interest of a person entitled 
to the whole or any part of the land’ within the meaning of section 12(5) of the Acquisition of Land 
Act 1967 (Qld).
124
 While the licence was not an ‘interest in land’, as that term has been interpreted at 
common law and under certain statutes, McMurdo P held it was a ‘right’ over the land, 125 and 
Chesterman JA held it was  ‘a right or power’ over the land,126 within the meaning of the second limb 
of the interpretation provision. In reaching their conclusion, the majority justices emphasized the 
subject matter and nature of the legislation. The provision in question determined whether a person 
was entitled to claim compensation for injurious affection arising from the compulsory acquisition of 
land, and the authorities indicated that such provisions should not be read down.
127
 Holmes JA, in 
dissent, held that the phrase ‘estate and interest in the land’ should be given its ordinary meaning 
which, according to Aickin J in Stow v Mineral Holdings (Australia) Pty Ltd (1977) 180 CLR 295,
128
 
is:  
an estate or interest of a proprietary nature in the land.  This would include legal and equitable estates 
and interests, eg, a freehold or a leasehold estate, or incorporeal interest such as easements, profits à 
prendre... 
 
Holmes JA noted that the interpretation of Aickin J was adopted by the High Court in The Queen v 
Toohey; Ex parte Meneling Station Pty Ltd (1982) 158 CLR 327. In holding that a grazing licence 
was not ‘an estate or interest in land’ within the meaning of the definition of ‘unalienated Crown land’ 
in section 3(1) of the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976, Mason J said:
129
 
There is no question that the phrase ‘estate or interest’ in s. 3(1) of the Act has, in its ordinary and 
natural usage, a proprietary connotation.
130
 No one who has a merely personal right in relation to 
land can be said to have an "estate or interest" in that land.  
 
It could be argued that because an exception to indefeasibility derogates from the registered 
proprietor’s title, the context indicates or requires that the phrase ‘interest of a petroleum authority 
holder’ in the Land Title Act should be construed according to the ‘ordinary and natural usage’ 
                                                          
122 Mijo Developments v Royal Agnes Waters Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 199 at [29]. 
123 Mijo Developments v Royal Agnes Waters Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 199 at [37]-[38]. 
124 Sorrento Medical Service P/L v Chief Executive, Dept of Main Roads [2007] 2 Qd R 273.  
125 Ibid [14]. 
126 Ibid [71], [77] per Chesterman J. 
127 Ibid [11]-[12] per McMurdo P (citing Gaudron J in Marshall v Director General Department of Transport (2001) 205 CLR 603, 623); [57] 
per Chesterman JA. 
128 at 311, cited by Holmes JA in Sorrento Medical Service Pty Ltd v Chief Executive, Department of Main Roads [2007] 2 Qd R 273 at [24]. 
129 (1982) 158 CLR 327 at 342.  
130 See Stow v Mineral Holdings (Australia) Pty Ltd (1977) 180 CLR 295 at 311; (1977) 51 ALJR 672 at 679; Harada v Registrar of Titles [1981] 
VR 743 at 748.  
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described by Mason J, displacing the broader meaning given by the second limb of the interpretation 
provision. The result would be similar if the second limb were displaced but not the first limb, 
consistently with the approach taken in Henderson v Bradshaw to the meaning of ‘interest in land’ in 
sections 11 and 59 of the Property Law Act. Although Hammerschlag J in Mijo Developments 
accepted that both limbs of the interpretation provision applied to section 22 of the Land Title Act, the 
caveat provisions allow for the recording of untested claims, while sections 184 and 185 deal with the 
scope of indefeasibility of registered interests.  
 
It would be exceptional for the Land Title Act to subordinate a registered title to a ‘right, privilege or 
power’ in relation to land that does not amount to a proprietary interest in the land. The term ‘interest’ 
is also used in paras (b) to (g) of section 185(1) to create other exceptions to indefeasibility, and an 
ejusdem generis reading would suggest that only an estate or interest in land can be an exception to 
indefeasibility. This argument is weakened by the later insertion of paras (i) and (j), which add ‘the 
interest of a GHG authority holder under the Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2009 under an access 
agreement under that Act’ and ‘the interest of a geothermal tenure holder under the Geothermal 
Energy Act 2010 under an access agreement under that Act’ respectively.  
 
The principal difficulty with the narrow interpretation of ‘interest’ in section 185(1)(h) is that it would 
deny the provision any effect. The ‘interest’ to which section 185(1)(h) refers is that of ‘a petroleum 
authority holder under the Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act under an access agreement 
under that Act’. The Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act does not confer a proprietary 
interest in land upon the PA holder under an access agreement, nor does it authorise the agreement to 
do so. An ‘access agreement’ is defined as an oral or written agreement to the exercise by the PA 
holder of its rights of access over the access land.
131
 Nothing in the Act states or necessarily implies 
that the statutory right of access is a proprietary interest in the access land amounting to a legal or 
equitable interest in the land. The purpose of the access agreement is to remove certain restrictions on 
the exercise of the access rights, namely the requirements as to consent and the giving of notice of 
entry.
132
 An access agreement can provide rights of access for the duration of the agreement, which 
bind the landowner’s successors in title.133 An access agreement is functionally similar to an easement, 
but the legislation does not deem it to be an easement, and is silent as to its nature.
134
  
 
If ‘interest’ in section 185(1)(h) bears its ordinary meaning of a proprietary interest in land, then there 
is no ‘interest of the petroleum authority holder ... under an access agreement..’ to which the provision 
can apply. Since legislation is presumed to have been intended to have effect, the phrase ‘the interest 
of a petroleum authority holder ... under an access agreement...’ must encompass the changes to the 
exercise of the PA holder’s statutory right of access under an access agreement. An access agreement 
                                                          
131 Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) ss 503(1), (2). 
132 Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) s 503(1) (as to consent) and ss 506(1), 497 (as to giving of notice). 
133 Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) ss 502, 503, 506, 507. 
134 An access agreement does not limit or affect the ability of the landowner to grant the PA holder a right of access in the form of an 
easement: Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) s 506(4). 
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can remove the restriction on the exercise of the rights without the consent of the landowner.
135
 If the 
removal of this restriction on the statutory right of access can be described as ‘a right, power or 
privilege over, or in relation to, the land’, it could be an ‘interest’ protected by section 185(1)(h).  
 
It seems to have been intended that an access agreement can also remove the statutory requirement to 
give an entry notice. Section 506(2) provides that an access agreement may include a waiver of entry 
notice, or ‘alternative provisions’ for entry. The provision is puzzling, since the Act does not 
expressly create any requirement for an entry notice in relation to access land. Section 506(1) 
provides that ‘section 497 applies for any entry to the land by a petroleum authority holder as if the 
entry were an entry to carry out authorised activities’. Section 495 creates a requirement for a PA 
holder to give written notice of entry before entering private land in the authority area. Section 497 
provides for exemptions from the notice requirement in certain circumstances, including where a 
conduct and compensation agreement (not access agreement) provides for waiver of the entry notice. 
The curious effect of section 506(1) is to make the exemption provision apply to access land, but not 
the provision that creates the requirement of an entry notice in the first place. 
 
For section 185(1)(h) to apply, the ‘interest’ must have been acquired under an access agreement 
made before the registered proprietor became the registered proprietor of the lot, and the access 
agreement must be one that, under the Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act, binds the 
registered proprietor.
136
 The purpose of section 185(1)(h) appears to be to reinforce section 507 of the 
Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act, which provides that, subject to the power of the 
Land Court to vary an access agreement, the agreement binds the parties and each of their personal 
representatives, successors in title and assigns. Without the insertion of section 185(1)(h) into the  
Land Title Act, section 507 might be interpreted as binding only successors in title and assigns of 
unregistered interests.
137
 The amendment to section 185(1) is intended to ensure that the landowner’s 
successors in title and assigns who are bound by the access agreement before they acquire registered 
title are also bound after registration.  
 
An access agreement can also provide for compensation in relation to the exercise of access rights.
138
 
Generally compensation is for the benefit of the landowner, but the PA holder might seek to  rely on a 
‘full and final settlement’ clause which bars further compensation claims, subject to section 509 
which allows the Land Court to vary agreements upon a material change in circumstances.
139
 Such a 
                                                          
135 Restriction contained in Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) s 503(1).  
136 Land Title Act 1994 (Qld) s 185(1)(h). 
137 For examples of restrictive interpretation of later statutes to avoid derogating from the indefeasibility provisions, see Solak v Registrar 
of Titles [2011] VSCA 279 (a provision denying enforcement of a mortgage unsigned by the mortgagor held not to apply to registered 
mortgages); Horvath v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [1999] 1 VR 643 (provision invalidating mortgage to minor held not to apply to 
registered mortgage). 
138 Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) s 506(3). 
139 For judicial interpretation of the phrase ‘material change in circumstances’, see Re Alliance Petroleum Australia Pty Ltd [1997] ACompT 
2 (14 October 1997) at 16 per Lockhart J (President), Dr M Brunt and Dr B Aldrich; Re Benney v Vella [2003] QLRT 80 at [8], [10]; Hicks v 
Graham [2004] QLRT 47 at [29]-[31], [36]; Slater v Appleton [2012] QLC 7 (24 February 2012) at [35]-[36]. 
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clause may be said to be reasonably incidental to an access agreement, and therefore binding on the 
landowner’s successors in title by force of section 506(3).  
The question then arises whether a term relating to compensation on which the PA holder may wish to 
rely is an ‘interest’ protected by section 185(1)(h). It is arguable that a ‘right, privilege or power over, 
or in relation to the land’ [our emphasis] is limited to a covenant of the access agreement that touches 
and concerns the land, or is incidental to an interest in the land (like the equity of rectification 
considered in Downie v Lockwood [1965] VR 257).
140
 Additionally it is arguable that because an 
access agreement derogates from the indefeasibility of a registered proprietor’s title, the context 
requires that terms gaining the benefits of indefeasibility must be strictly within the statutory scope of 
an ‘access agreement’. On this view the only terms which would gain the benefits of indefeasibility 
would be terms for access over the land that is reasonably necessary, terms for carrying out of 
activities that are reasonably necessary to allow access, and terms incidental to these matters. It is 
doubtful that the benefits of indefeasibility would extend to a term relating to compensation. 
                                                                                          
It is possible that the parties may include other terms in an access agreement that do not fall within the 
scope of the statutory provisions. There is no reason why those terms would not be enforceable in 
contract between the parties, but they would not get the benefit of the extended operation provided for 
an access agreement in section 507, nor would they comprise an ‘interest of a petroleum authority 
holder’ within the meaning of section 185(1)(h). Purchasers from the landowner will need to assess 
whether any particular term falls outside the statutory scope of an access agreement that is binding on 
them.  
 
3.1.2 Enforcement of an access agreement against registered lessees and mortgagees 
The principles outlined above are applicable to the enforceability of an access agreement against 
successive landowners. Different principles may apply to determine the enforceability of an access 
agreement against a registered lessee or a registered mortgagee. Enforceability will also turn upon 
whether the access agreement was in existence at the time the lease or mortgage was granted.  
 
(A) Lessees 
Where there is a pre-existing lease over private land, the PA holder must enter into an access 
agreement with the lessee because they are an ‘occupier’ of the land.141 
 
If the landowner enters into an access agreement with the PA holder and then leases the land, section 
185(1)(h) of the Land Title Act may apply. The exception to indefeasibility in this section will apply if 
                                                          
140 ‘The phrase ‘in relation to’ is one of wide import and is satisfied by a connection or association between the two things in question. It 
should not be read down unless there be compelling reasons to do so’: Mijo Developments v Royal Agnes Waters [2007] NSWSC 199 at 
[38]. However even under this wide interpretation, a ‘connection or association’ with the land will still be required.  
141 Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) s 503(1)(b). Sch 2 Dictionary states that occupier, of a place, means a 
person— 
(a) who, under an Act, or, for freehold land, a lease registered under the Land Title Act 1994, has a right to occupy the place, other than 
under a mining interest, petroleum tenure, licence, GHG authority or geothermal tenure; or 
(b) to whom an occupier under paragraph (a) has given the right to occupy the place. 
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the registered lessee is bound by the access agreement under section 507 of the Act.
142
 Section 507 
provides that an access agreement will bind the ‘personal representatives, successors in title and 
assigns’ of the original landowner.  
 
Is a lessee a personal representative, successor in title or assign of the original landowner? 
The terms ‘personal representative’, ‘successor in title’ and ‘assign’ are undefined in the relevant 
legislation.
143
 The noun ‘assign’, means ‘assignee’ and refers to one who receives the whole of 
another person’s estate or interest in land. ‘Successor’ refers to 'he that followeth or cometh in 
another's place’ which ‘tends to be the sense in which the word is used in the [common law].’144 A 
lessee is not a personal representative of the landowner. A leasehold estate is not the whole of the 
landowner’s interest in the land, and a lessee does not succeed to the fee simple interest of the original 
landowner. A lessee holds a derivative interest only and will not be a personal representative, 
successor in title or assign of the original landowner. Consequently the interest of a PA holder under 
an access agreement will not be an exception to the indefeasible title of a registered lessee and the 
access agreement will not be enforceable against the registered lessee.    
 
Another possible scenario is where an ‘occupier’ (lessee) enters into an access agreement with the PA 
holder and then assigns the lease or sub-leases the land. A third party who takes an assignment of the 
lease will be a successor in title and assign of the original lessee, and will therefore be bound by the 
access agreement under section 185(1)(h) of the Land Title Act. However, a sub-lessee takes a 
derivative interest only. A sub-lessee will not be a successor in title or assign of the original lessee and 
consequently will not be bound by the access agreement. 
 
(B) Mortgagees 
Where there is a pre-existing mortgage over private land, the exception to indefeasibility in section 
185(1)(h) of the Land Title Act will not apply because the access agreement was not made before the 
mortgagee became registered.
145
 
 
If the landowner enters into an access agreement with the PA holder and then mortgages the land, 
sections 185(1)(h) and 507 may apply
146
 and it will be necessary to determine if a mortgagee is a 
personal representative, successor in title or assign of the original landowner. The abovementioned 
definitions of ‘successor’ and ‘assign’ will apply. As with a lessee, a mortgagee holds a derivative 
interest only and is unlikely to fall within either of these categories. 
                                                          
142 Land Title Act 1994 (Qld) s 185(1)(h). 
143 Land Title Act 1994 (Qld), Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld), Property Law Act 1974 (Qld), Acts Interpretation 
Act 1954 (Qld). Although Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) s 53(3) states “successors in title shall be deemed to include the owners and 
occupiers for the time being of such land”, this is for the purpose of covenants relating to land.  
144 Retravision (NSW) Ltd v Copeland (unreported, NSWSC, 8 October 1997) cited in Needlegrove Investments Pty Limited v Thakral 
Brighton Hotel Pty Limited [2007] NSWSC 89 at [62]. See also Kestrel Coal Pty Ltd v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union 
(unreported, Qld SC, 11 November 1999) which states that ‘‘successor’ has the everyday language meaning of one who succeeds to or 
takes the place or position of another’: per Muir J at [16]. 
145 Land Title Act 1994 (Qld) s 185(1)(h)(i). 
146 Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) s 507; Land Title Act 1994 (Qld) s 185(1)(h).  
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In United Starr-Bowkett Co-operative Building Society (No 11) Ltd v Clyne (1967) 68 SR (NSW) 331, 
it was held that a mortgagee may be a ‘successor in title’ to a lessor-mortgagor where the mortgagee 
succeeds to, that is becomes entitled and subject to, the mortgagor’s rights and duties, as between 
himself and the tenant, under a lease granted by the mortgagor prior to the mortgage.
147
 However this 
case considered a section of legislation which expressly included a mortgagee in possession as a 
‘successor in title’. The case also held that ‘the nature of a mortgage of land under the Real Property 
Act is such that it cannot be said that the mortgagee thereunder succeeds to the estate of the 
mortgagor.’148 Therefore it appears a mortgagee under the Torrens system will not be a successor in 
title by mere fact of the mortgage alone. There must be additional circumstances such as the 
mortgagee becoming entitled to the mortgagor’s rights and duties.  
 
This is confirmed by the Act which defines owner to include a mortgagee in possession of the land 
who has the exclusive management and control of the land.
149
 It appears that an access agreement will 
be enforceable against a mortgagee who enters into possession of the land, but otherwise will not be 
an exception to their indefeasible title.  
 
 
3.2. Enforcement of conduct and compensation agreements against third parties 
 
Section 537E of the Act states: 
(1) A conduct and compensation agreement or a Land Court decision under this part is for the benefit of, 
and is taken to have been agreed to or decided for and is binding on, the following— 
(a) the relevant eligible claimant; 
(b) the petroleum authority holder; 
(c) each of their successors and assigns including successors and assigns for the area of the relevant 
petroleum authority. 
 
Prima facie, the section appears to intend that all covenants in a conduct and compensation agreement 
will be enforceable by and against third parties, regardless of whether the covenant imposes a positive 
or negative burden, touches and concerns the land or is a personal obligation only. This result would 
be a substantial departure from the traditional common law and Property Law Act rules discussed 
above. The section must be construed carefully, in particular its interaction with the indefeasibility 
provisions of the Land Title Act.  
 
Unlike access agreements, there is no exception to indefeasibility conferred upon a conduct and 
compensation agreement by section 185 of the Land Title Act. A third party who takes a registered 
interest in the land will hold their interest ‘subject to registered interests affecting the lot but free from 
                                                          
147 United Starr-Bowkett Co-operative Building Society (No 11) Ltd v Clyne (1967) 68 SR (NSW) 331. 
148 United Starr-Bowkett Co-operative Building Society (No 11) Ltd v Clyne (1967) 68 SR (NSW) 331. 
149 Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) sch 2.  
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all other interests’ pursuant to section 184 of the Land Title Act. If a conduct and compensation 
agreement is an ‘interest’, section 184 will prevent enforcement of this interest against a subsequent 
registered proprietor of an interest in the land.  
 
Is a conduct and compensation agreement an ‘interest’ in the land under section 184 of the Land Title 
Act? 
The meaning of ‘interest’ in sections 184 and 185 of the Land Title Act is discussed above at 3.1.1. 
We have concluded that ‘interest’ in these sections is likely to take the wider meaning set out in the 
second limb of the definition in s 36(1) of the Acts Interpretation Act, 
150
 namely ‘ 
(a) a right, power or privilege over, or in relation to, the land or other property’.151  
 
Under this definition, it is arguable that a covenant in a conduct and compensation agreement which 
confers a right, power or privilege over, or in relation to, the land is likely to be an ‘interest’ affecting 
the land. Pursuant to section 184 of the Land Title Act, these ‘interests’ will not be enforceable against 
a subsequent registered proprietor of an interest in the land. Conversely, section 537E of the Act 
provides that a conduct and compensation agreement will bind successors and assigns of the original 
landowner. Prima facie, there is a conflict between the sections 184 and 537E. To resolve this conflict 
it may be necessary to apply the common law principles of implied statutory repeal.  
 
 Has section 537E of the Act impliedly repealed section 184 of the Land Title Act? 
It is a well-established feature of Australian property law that overriding statutes are an exception to 
indefeasibility of title under the Torrens system.
152
 Whether the later statute has overridden the earlier 
statute is fundamentally a question of statutory interpretation.
153
 Cases upon overriding statutes are 
inconsistent and difficult to reconcile, however, judicial consideration of this issue generally takes one 
of two approaches.  
 
The first is the ‘conflict and implied repeal’ approach.154 Pursuant to this approach, it must be 
determined whether a conflict exists between the statutory provisions. There is a presumption that 
Parliament does not intend to contradict itself.
155
 This presumption is not easily displaced
156
 and the 
                                                          
150 We have reached this conclusion primarily because of the insertion of sub-sections 185(h), (i) and (j), all of which provide that the 
‘interest’ of an authority holder under an access agreement is an exception to indefeasibility. In order for these sections to have effect, the 
wider definition of ‘interest’ must apply for section 185 and, consequently, for section 184 of the Land Title Act. 
151 Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) s 36. 
152 B Edgeworth, ‘Planning Law vs Property Law: Overriding Statutes and the Torrens System after Hillpalm v Heaven's Door and Kogarah v 
Golden Paradise’ (2008) 25 EPLJ 82. For further discussion on this issue see P O’Connor, S Christensen and W D Duncan, ‘Legislating for 
Sustainability: A Framework for Managing Rights, Obligations and Restrictions Affecting Private Land’ (2009) 35(1) Mon LR 233 at 240-242. 
153 South Eastern Drainage Board (SA) v Savings Bank of SA (1939) 62 CLR 603 per Dixon J at 627-628; Hillpalm Pty Ltd v Heaven’s Door Pty 
Ltd (2004) 220 CLR 472 at [50]; Wirkus v Wilson Lawyers [2012] QSC 150 at [54]. 
154 This phrase taken from S Hepburn, ‘Interpretive Strategies in the Overriding Legislation Exception to Indefeasibility’ (2009) 21(2) Bond 
LR 86 at 88. Cases taking this approach include Miller v Minister for Mines [1963] AC 484; South Eastern Drainage Board (SA) v Savings 
Bank of SA (1939) 62 CLR 603; Pratten v Warringah Shire Council [1969] 2 NSWR 161; Quach v Marrickville Council (1990) 22 NSWLR 55; 
Calabro v Bayside City Council [1999] 3 VR 688; Wirkus v Wilson Lawyers [2012] QSC 150. 
155 Butler v Attorney-General (Vic) (1961) 106 CLR 268 at 276 per Fullagar J. 
156 City of Canada Bay Council v Bonaccorso Pty Ltd (2007) 71 NSWLR 424; (2007) 13 BPR 24, 881 at 24,881. 
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actual contrariety between statutes must be readily apparent.
157
 If the later enactment contains clear 
language from which it is plain that its provisions were intended to apply in a manner inconsistent 
with the earlier statute,
158
 the appropriate conclusion is that the earlier statute is repealed pro tanto.
159
 
Factors which have assisted in a finding of implied repeal include: 
(a) rights under a later statutory provision could not be placed upon the land title register;160 
(b) rights under a later statutory provision had an ongoing effect as opposed to a once-off breach 
of a statute prohibiting a particular dealing with Torrens land;
161
 
(c) rights under a later statutory provision were of a public nature or in the public interest, such as 
creation of a public highway.
162
 
It is arguable that section 537E contains clear language indicating that it is intended to apply in a 
manner inconsistent with section 184 of the Land Title Act. The statement that ‘a conduct and 
compensation agreement...is binding upon...successors and assigns’ clearly demonstrates an intention 
that successive landowners will be bound by a conduct and compensation agreement, which conflicts 
with the indefeasibility provisions of the Land Title Act. 
 
Pursuant to the ‘conflict and implied repeal’ approach, section 537E may override section 184 as it is 
the later statutory provision. Additionally, conduct and compensation agreements will have an 
ongoing effect, and cannot be placed on the land title register. These factors may assist in a finding 
that section 537E has impliedly repealed section 184. Conduct and compensation agreements confer 
private rights, not public rights, upon a PA holder and it is doubtful that this factor will be conducive 
towards a finding of implied repeal.  
 
There are factors for and against a finding that section 537E has impliedly repealed section 184 of the 
Land Title Act. It is not possible to come to a satisfactory conclusion on this matter under a ‘conflict 
and implied repeal’ approach.  
 
An alternative ‘sequential assessment’ approach163 has become more prevalent in recent years. This 
approach hinges upon a finding by the Court that there is no conflict between the statutory provisions 
                                                          
157 Butler v Attorney-General (Vic) (1961) 106 CLR 268 at 276 per Fullagar J. 
158 South Eastern Drainage Board (SA) v Savings Bank of SA (1939) 62 CLR 603 per Dixon J at 625. For example where a provision contained 
a clear intention to include land under the relevant Torrens statute and to give the statutory proprietary rights an absolute and 
indefeasible priority over all other interests, it was held to prevail over the earlier Torrens statute containing the principle of indefeasibility 
of title: per Dixon J at 627-628. 
159 South Eastern Drainage Board (SA) v Savings Bank of SA (1939) 62 CLR 603 per Dixon J at 626. 
160 South Eastern Drainage Board (SA) v Savings Bank of SA (1939) 62 CLR 603 per Dixon J at 629. 
161 City of Canada Bay Council v Bonaccorso Pty Ltd (2007) 71 NSWLR 424; (2007) 13 BPR 24, 881 at 24,893. Examples provided were: the 
ongoing use of a public road (Vickery v Municipality of Strathfield (1911) 11 SR (NSW) 354); an ongoing statutory charge (South Eastern 
Drainage Board (SA) v Savings Bank of SA (1939) 62 CLR 603); and the continuous use of drainage reserves (Pratten v Warringah Shire 
Council [1969] 2 NSWR 161; Quach v Marrickville Council (1990) 22 NSWLR 55).  
162 See, for example, Calabro v Bayside City Council [1999] 3 VR 688 at [59]: “Councils have a duty, in the public interest, to ensure that if a 
public highway is required for public traffic it is kept open for public use”; Roach v Bickle (1915) 20 CLR 663 at 669-70 per Isaacs J and 
Gavan-Duffy J; Quach v Marrickville Council (1990) 22 NSWLR 85 at 61 per Young J. Kirby J (in dissent) stated in Hillpalm Pty Ltd v Heaven’s 
Door Pty Ltd (2004) 220 CLR 472 that canons of statutory construction include precedence to public over purely private rights, citing P E 
Bakers Pty Ltd v Yehuda (1988) 66 LGRA 403 at 410; Hillpalm Pty Ltd v Heaven’s Door Pty Ltd (2002) 55 NSWLR 446 at 449. 
163 This phrase taken from Hepburn, above n 162, 88. Cases taking this approach include Hillpalm Pty Ltd v Heaven’s Door Pty Ltd (2004) 
220 CLR 472; City of Canada Bay Council v Bonaccorso Pty Ltd (2007) 71 NSWLR 424; Kogarah Municipal Council v Golden Paradise Corp 
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or, where a conflict is established, that the provisions can operate ‘sequentially’ and therefore no 
implied repeal has occurred. Notably this approach was taken in the recent High Court decision of 
Hillpalm v Heaven’s Door (2004) 220 CLR 472. The Court held that a later statutory provision 
prohibiting development being carried out otherwise than in accordance with the development consent 
applied to the original developer only. The provision was not enforceable against a subsequent 
registered proprietor who gained the benefits of indefeasibility.
164
 The later statutory prohibition did 
not create a right in rem and therefore, the question of implied repeal did not arise.
165
 
 
This approach has been followed in other decisions. For example, in City of Canada Bay v 
Bonaccorso (2007) 71 NSWLR 424 a later statutory provision prohibiting the transfer of ‘community 
land’ was held to invalidate the transaction up until the point of registration. Upon registration, the 
indefeasibility provisions operated to confer a new grant of the fee simple in the land.
166
 This instance 
of the ‘sequential assessment’ approach led to a conclusion that the later statutory provision applied 
before registration and the indefeasibility provisions applied after registration.  
 
If the ‘sequential assessment’ approach is taken to interpretation of the provisions at hand, section 
537E may be construed as binding unregistered successors and assigns of the original landowner, 
while section 184 of the Land Title Act will operate after registration to confer indefeasible title upon 
registered successors and assigns of the original landowner. This conclusion appears to be supported 
by the fact that the Act as passed inserted an exception to indefeasibility into the Land Title Act for 
access agreements but not for conduct and compensation agreements.
167
  
 
Although the ‘sequential assessment’ approach has been favoured in recent judgments, a strong 
remnant of the ‘conflict and implied repeal’ approach remains.168 It is difficult to predict the approach 
that a Court will take to interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions. Notably, if the 
indefeasibility provisions are impliedly repealed by section 537E, the section may only apply to 
agreements falling within the proper scope of a conduct and compensation agreement as set out in the 
Act.
169
  
 
What if a conduct and compensation agreement is not an ‘interest’ in the land? 
The above discussion regarding implied repeal is based upon the assumption that a conduct and 
compensation agreement is an ‘interest’ in the land for the purposes of section 184 of the Land Title 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(2005) 12 BPR 23, 651; Koompahtoo Local Aboriginal Land Council v KLALC Property Investment [2008] NSWCA 6; Epworth Group Holdings 
v Permanent Custodians (2010) 108 SASR 556; Rofail v Wells [2012] QPELR 151. 
164 Hillpalm Pty Ltd v Heaven’s Door Pty Ltd (2004) 220 CLR 472 at [52] per McHugh, Hayne and Heydon JJ.  
165 Hillpalm Pty Ltd v Heaven’s Door Pty Ltd (2004) 220 CLR 472 at [53] per McHugh, Hayne and Heydon JJ. 
166 at 24,899. 
167 Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) as passed s 946 (‘Amendment of s 185 (exceptions to s 184)’). 
168 See, for example, Quach v Marrickville Council (1990) 22 NSWLR 85 at 61 per Young J: ‘it is very difficult now to contend that the 
mainstream indefeasibility provisions, such as s 42 of the [Real Property] Act operate to defeat the statutory right of the Council. It has 
been well recognised, both by the textwriters and by the authorities that, although it is the weakest point in the Torrens System, statutory 
and public rights will override an indefeasible title.’ See also F & D Bonaccorso v City of Canada Bay City Council [2007] NSWLEC 159 
(overruled on appeal in City of Canada Bay Council v Bonaccorso Pty Ltd (2007) 71 NSWLR 424).  
169 Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) ss 533, 534.  
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Act. Conversely, if the view is taken that a conduct and compensation agreement is not an ‘interest’ in 
the land, there will be no conflict with section 184 of the Land Title Act and section 537E will operate 
on its own terms. This raises the question of whether the section is effective to bind third parties 
taking an interest in the land merely by stating that conduct and compensation agreements are 
‘binding upon....successors and assigns’. 
 
An examination of the scheme and purpose of the Act may be necessary to construe section 537E, 
particularly in light of the purposive approach taken by the Queensland Supreme Court to statutory 
interpretation.
170
 Section 537E does not distinguish between positive and negative covenants, or 
covenants which touch and concern the land and covenants which do not. Sections 533 and 534 of the 
Act arguably impose limits on the allowable scope of a conduct and compensation agreement. For 
example, the scope of an agreement would not appear to extend to imposition of a positive obligation 
upon the landowner. It is possible that covenants which fall outside of sections 533 and 534 cannot 
properly be classified as a ‘conduct and compensation agreement’ and will not gain the protection 
afforded by section 537E. The enforceability of these covenants may instead be determined by the 
above-mentioned common law and Property Law Act rules.  
 
The main purpose of the Act is to facilitate and regulate the carrying out of responsible petroleum 
activities and the development of a safe, efficient and viable petroleum and fuel gas industry in a way 
that, inter alia, ensures petroleum activities are carried on in a way that minimises conflict with other 
land uses, and appropriately compensates owners or occupiers of land.
171
 The section heading of 
537E is ‘compensation not affected by change in ownership or occupancy’. Furthermore, the Act as 
passed inserted an exception to indefeasibility for access agreements into the Land Title Act, but not 
for conduct and compensation agreements. The purpose and overall scheme of the Act may indicate 
that the compensation agreed under a conduct and compensation agreement is intended to bind 
successors and assigns, but other terms of the agreement, particularly terms touching and concerning 
the land, are not. Section 537C also requires a party to apply to the Land Court to alter compensation 
once it has been agreed to under a conduct and compensation agreement, which supports a conclusion 
that successors and assigns will be bound by the original compensation provisions. 
 
3.2.1 Enforcement of a conduct and compensation agreement against registered lessees and 
mortgagees 
A conduct and compensation agreement is expressed to be binding upon ‘successors and assigns’ of 
the landowner.
172
 As previously outlined, neither a lessee nor a mortgagee is a successor or assign of 
the original landowner and the agreement will not be enforceable against them. The principles 
                                                          
170 Meridien AB Pty Ltd v Jackson (as Trustee for the Jackson Family Trust) [2012] QSC 260; Special Projects (Qld) Pty Ltd v Simmons [2012] 
QCA 205; the whole scheme of the later Act, and the purpose of the statute was emphasised by Dixon J in South Eastern Drainage Board 
(SA) v Savings Bank of SA (1939) 62 CLR 603 at 628-630; see also Miller v Minister of Mines [1961] NZLR 820 at 839 (affirmed on appeal in 
Miller v Minister for Mines [1963] AC 484). Further to this, the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) s 14A (1) states: ‘In the interpretation of a 
provision of an Act, the interpretation that will best achieve the purpose of the Act is to be preferred to any other interpretation.’ 
171 Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) ss 3(f),(h). 
172 Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) s 537E(1)(c). 
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outlined above at 3.1.2(A) will also apply if a lessee enters into a conduct and compensation 
agreement with a PA holder and then assigns the lease or sub-leases the land.  
 
 
3.3. Incorporation of both agreements in one document 
Commonly a petroleum authority will cover only part of a landowner’s property (‘authority land’), 
while the remainder of the property is ‘access land’. In this situation the following agreements must 
be entered into between the PA holder and the landowner: 
(a) A conduct and compensation agreement for authority land;173 
(b) An access agreement for access land;174 and 
(c) A conduct and compensation agreement to compensate for the effects of authorised activities 
on access land.
175
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
               =  area of landowner’s property 
 
The Act states that an access agreement may include a compensation agreement in relation to the 
exercise of access rights.
176
 It does not state that an access agreement may include a conduct and 
compensation agreement in relation to authority land. Despite this, it is common industry practice for 
a PA holder to enter into a single agreement with a landowner which incorporates an access 
agreement and conduct and compensation agreements for land outside and inside the petroleum 
authority. The above diagram demonstrates the perceived efficiency of such an arrangement. However 
the distinction made between access agreements and conduct and compensation agreements in the 
Land Title Act militates against any perceived efficiency of incorporating the two in one document.  
 
                                                          
173 Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) s 500. 
174 Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) s 503. 
175 Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) ss 532(1), 533(1). 
176 Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) s 506(3) (‘Conduct and compensation agreement’ was referred to as a 
‘compensation agreement’ when the Act, including s 506, was originally enacted).  
Land outside of Petroleum       Land inside of Petroleum Authority 
Authority         
  ↓     ↓   
  
Access agreement required (s 503 Act)  
(exception to indefeasibility under Conduct and compensation 
s 185(1)(h) Land Title Act)   agreement required (s 500 Act) 
+   
Conduct and compensation  
agreement required (ss 532(1), 533(1) Act) 
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Within the one agreement, certain terms (of an ‘access agreement’) will gain the benefits of 
indefeasibility while other terms (of a ‘conduct and compensation agreement’) will not. It may be 
exceedingly difficult to ascertain which terms fall within an ‘access agreement’. Once this is 
determined, it may then be difficult or impossible to sever these terms from the remainder of the 
agreement.  
 
4. Recommendations 
Land access agreements are a peculiar hybrid of contract, statute and property law but do not conform 
to the established legal rules of any of these areas. This creates uncertainty for PA holders and third 
parties. Parties are allowed to create their own contractual terms which purport to bind third parties, 
abrogating the established principle that original parties (A and B) cannot impose obligations upon a 
third party (C). Furthermore the legislation does not place limits upon the allowable content of land 
access agreements. Unlike established proprietary interests such as an easement and a profit a prendre, 
the incidents, enforceability and scope of a land access agreement are underspecified.  
 
While the difficulties identified in this article can be overcome by entry into a tripartite deed between 
the PA holder, original landowner and successive landowner binding the successive landowner to the 
land access agreement, ideally, a fundamental reconsideration of land access agreements is required. 
The use of a contract to establish long-running access rights over land is deficient from a property law 
perspective. Instead a new statutory right of access, similar to an easement, could be granted to a PA 
holder.
177
 This statutory right of access could grant rights of access to the land both inside and outside 
of the petroleum authority. The Act could specify the incidents of a statutory right of access, including 
its enforceability against successors in title, assigns and other interest holders such as mortgagees, 
lessees and sub-lessees. A statutory right of access would provide a broad right of access to the 
relevant land and parties could then negotiate particulars of access to suit their individual business 
operations.
178
 Extinguishment by Court order may not be appropriate
179
 and instead a statutory right of 
access would run for the duration of the petroleum authority.  
 
In addition to a statutory right of access, a compensation package could be agreed between the PA 
holder and the landowner at the time the petroleum authority is granted. The compensation package 
would cover compensation liability as defined in the Act. It would be susceptible to variation only 
through Court order as is currently prescribed in the Act.
180
 A compensation package would operate 
independently of the statutory right of access.  
 
                                                          
177 See for example Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) s 180.  
178 Particulars of access may be dependent upon a PA holder’s business hours and operation plan, and the landowner’s specific use/s of 
the land (eg cattle grazing, crops, or other agricultural activities). 
179 As required by the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) s 180. 
180 Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) s 537C.  
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Given the political nature of the subject matter,
181
 it is recognised that a fundamental reconsideration 
of the current legislation is highly unlikely. Therefore, we propose the following amendments to the 
current legislative regime. 
 
1. A method of notifying prospective purchasers, lessees and mortgagees of the existence of a 
land access agreement should be implemented. Currently, there is no requirement for access 
agreements or conduct and compensation agreements to be recorded or registered upon the 
land title register or any other public register. A register exists for petroleum tenures
182
 and 
prospective purchasers can search this register for details relating to a petroleum authority,
183
 
but no method of searching a register for the existence or contents of an access agreement or 
conduct and compensation agreement exists.  
 
2. The Land Access Review Panel report recommends conduct and compensation agreements be 
recorded on the certificate of title.
184
 Alternatively, the existence of an agreement could be 
noted on the administrative advices register maintained by the Registrar of Titles.
185
 It would 
be appropriate for an agreement to be noted on this register as it is designed to contain 
information necessary or desirable for the efficient operation of the land title register.
186
 It 
may be necessary to provide that a land access agreement does not bind successors and 
assigns unless recorded on the administrative advices register in order to provide the relevant 
agencies with an incentive to notify.
187
 Even if these agreements were required to be 
registered or recorded on a public register, each one would require individual assessment due 
to variance in their terms. Consequently a mechanism should be implemented to ensure that 
prospective purchasers can obtain a copy of the land access agreement. This could be 
achieved through mandatory vendor disclosure of the existence and contents of land access 
agreements,
188
 failing which the purchaser will have a right to rescind the contract. 
 
                                                          
181 Coal seam gas extraction is a major industry in Queensland. Currently coal seam gas projects supply approximately 90% of 
Queensland’s gas. The development of an export LNG (primarily coal seam gas) industry is predicted to involve capital investments in 
excess of $60 billion, create approximately 18,000 new jobs with many in Queensland’s regional communities and contribute 
approximately $1 billion a year to State revenue: Liberal National Party, LNP Policy for a Sustainable Coal Seam Gas Industry (2011) 2 
<www.lnp.org.au> (accessed 15 October 2012). See also S Christensen et al, ‘Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Coal Mining 
Activities in the Context of Climate Change’ (2011) 28 EPLJ 381, 405-406. 
182 Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) s 564.   
183 Queensland Government Mining and Safety, Mines Online and Tenure Enquiry Reports (19 April 2012) 
<http://mines.industry.qld.gov.au/mining/mines-online-tenure-enquiry-reports.htm> (accessed 10 October 2012). 
184 D Watson et al, Land Access Framework – 12-month Review: Report of the Land Access Review Panel (Queensland Government Mining 
and Safety, February 2012) 25 <http://mines.industry.qld.gov.au/assets/native-title-pdf/Land_Access_Review_Panel_report.pdf> 
(accessed 12 October 2012). Registration of land access agreements upon the land title register is also recommended in G Farland and T 
Marshall, ‘Coal Seam Gas (CSG) Licences and Landholders’ Rights’ (2011) 26(9) AER 226 at 228. 
185 Land Title Act 1994 (Qld) s 34.  
186 Land Title Act 1994 (Qld) s 34(1).  
187 S Christensen, ‘Adapting the Torrens System for Sustainability – Can it be Better Utilised?’ (Paper presented at Australian Property Law 
Teachers Conference, Faculty of Law, University of Western Australia, 25 September 2010) 29-30. See, for example, Land Title Act (NT) s 
88(2): ‘Unless an overriding statutory charge is registered: (a) a restriction imposed by the statutory charge on the use of or dealing with 
the lot does not exist; or (b) a power arising under the statutory charge in relation to the lot is not exercisable.’ See also Nature 
Conservation Act 1992 (Qld) s 51(1) which provides that a conservation agreement between the State and a landowner is not binding on 
successors in title unless recorded by the registrar of titles under s 134 of the Act. 
188 Mandatory vendor disclosure is also recommended in G Farland and T Marshall, ‘Coal Seam Gas (CSG) Licences and Landholders’ Rights’ 
(2011) 26(9) AER 226 at 228.  
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3. There is a need for clarification of several matters in the Petroleum and Gas (Safety and 
Production) Act and the Land Title Act. The Petroleum and Gas (Safety and Production) Act 
should clearly set out the source of a PA holder’s right to access private land inside the 
petroleum authority. Both Acts must be amended to clarify whether a conduct and 
compensation agreement is enforceable against a subsequent registered proprietor of an 
interest in a lot, and if so, which terms are enforceable. Clarification of a land access 
agreement’s enforceability against all possible parties is also necessary, in particular 
registered mortgagees, lessees and sub-lessees.  
 
4. The definition of ‘interest’ in sections 184 and 185 of the Land Title Act is made uncertain by 
the introduction of section 185(1)(h). The meaning of ‘interest’ in these sections should be 
defined, potentially with reference to the Acts Interpretation Act definition of interest. This 
would include a statement of whether a conduct and compensation agreement is an ‘interest’ 
under sections 184 and 185 of the Land Title Act, and further specification of the scope of a 
PA holder’s ‘interest’ under an access agreement. 
 
The current statutory regime for land access agreements is fragmented and does not accord with any 
established legal rules. It will lead to significant uncertainty and transaction costs for subsequent 
holders of an interest in the relevant land. While the scope of a statutory covenant is necessarily 
limited, failure to specify the limits expressly leaves doubts as to whether particular types of terms in 
the agreements are binding on third parties, and which classes of third parties are bound.  Rectification 
of this situation would ideally come in the form of a fundamental reconsideration of the use of land 
access agreements. In the absence of such reform, the abovementioned legislative amendments should 
be considered.   
 
